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INTRODUCTION
Justice Kirby's paper is wide-ranging and most provocative. I am
very grateful to have the opportunity to respond to it, and hope that I
can justify the confidence of the organizers of the Grotius Lecture in
giving me this responsibility. In the space I have, I cannot respond to
the lecture in detail. I hope, however, that I can make clear at least
some of my reasons for my inability to agree completely with Justice
Kirby's arguments. My difficulties with his approach fall under three
headings. First, it seems to me that some of the objectives one might
hope to achieve through reliance on international law in construing
. Delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law,
Seventh Annual Grotius Lecture Series, Washington, DC, March 29, 2005.
.. Martha Brandis Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill.

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

366

[21:365

domestic constitutions are of doubtful legitimacy. Second, I am
troubled by the degree of authority Justice Kirby would allot to
judges. Finally, I believe that difficulties of determining the content
of international law are greater than does Justice Kirby. I will discuss
these points in turn.

I. THE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED
As Justice Kirby notes, a judge of a domestic court might examine
international and foreign sources to get a better understanding of a
problem before her-to gain perspective on a question by learning
how it was answered somewhere else and with what result, or to
facilitate resolving a problem by considering solutions that have
occurred to others but not, in the first instance, to the judge.' In such
a case, however, foreign and international materials play a role that
could equally be played by law review articles, political science
texts, or for that matter by novels or poetry-anything, in short, that
could trigger in the judge a train of thought that might help her deal
with a matter. It would seem to me that there is little controversy
about the use of foreign materials in such circumstances, but I also
doubt that Justice Kirby would confine international materials to so
modest a role.
If a domestic judge finds herself obliged to construe a legal
instrument which has earlier been construed by some other court
somewhere else, one would certainly expect the domestic judge to
pay particular attention to the other court's work. However, I do not
understand Justice Kirby to argue that different constitutions, no
matter how similar, are in some sense the same document.
What I understand Justice Kirby to say, however, is that different
constitutions might embody identical legal principles. In such cases,
he suggests, it would be useful for judges to borrow from one
another, to take advantage of one another's expertise, and to take part
in a dialogue concerning these principles.2
On this point, I question Justice Kirby's premise-that is, I
wonder whether it is accurate to assert that different constitutions, or
1. See

Michael

Kirby,

International Law-The

Constitutions, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 327, 337 (2006).
2. Id. at 348.

Impact on

National
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constitutions and international treaties, assert "identical" principles.
Even when the wording of constitutional or treaty provisions is
identical-and that is not the case with respect to a number of
important instruments 3-they
are susceptible to different
interpretations. Here, I do not mean to make the point that the
interpretation of language is not an exact science, in that reasonable
persons can differ as to the meaning of a particular phrase or
sentence. Rather, my point is that similar language can embody quite
different values.
Consider concepts of freedom of speech. As Professor Schauer has
noted in a recent paper, the United States extends constitutional
protection to speech which, in other States, may be prohibited as hate
speech; likewise, restrictions on defamation claims are much tighter
in the United States than in, for example, Europe.4 He suggests that
this phenomenon may be explained by the greater weight Americans
place on libertarian/individualistic values as opposed to values of
civility and equality, on American distrust of government, and on the
fact that, in the United States, protection of free speech has
traditionally been seen as an important element of the more liberal
current in American political thought.' In any event, however, it is
clear that Americans mean something different when they refer to

3. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech .... ."), with International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) ("1. Everyone shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the
rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights
or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public
order (ordrepublic), or of public health or morals.").
4. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment 1-19 (Working
paper, Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-668543. Among
others, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom have rejected the
American approach to defamation, "[b]elieving that the model places far too much
weight on the freedom of press side of the balance, and far. too little on the
reputational side ....Id. at 16.
5. 1d. at 22-27.

368

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[21:365

freedom of speech than do citizens of a number of other States when
they refer to freedom of expression.
A recent incident illustrates my point. The press has reported that
in February 2005, a Swedish appeals court overturned the conviction
of a Pentecostal minister for hate speech.6 Late last year, the minister
had preached a sermon harshly condemning homosexuality, which
relied on the Biblical prohibition of same-sex relationships.7 It strikes
me as outrageous that such a case would have to be appealed to be
thrown out, but then, as an American, I am accustomed to very strict
protections both for speech and religion.
It would seem, in short, that it is by no means obvious that all
constitutions, or even all constitutions of western states, can be seen
as embodying the same values. On the contrary, as Professor
Anderson discusses at length and with great eloquence in his recent
book review, a constitution embodies the values of the particular
community that has adopted it.8
If that is true, however, it would not make sense for an American
judge to be guided in interpreting the First Amendment by, for
example, interpretations of Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. 9 The two instruments, as they have
come to be understood, embody fundamentally different value
choices. If the two instruments differ so fundamentally, to try to see
them as somehow setting out identical principles is to distort both.
Likewise, for judges in one constitutional system to rely on opinions

6. See Keith B. Richburg, Swedish Hate-Speech Verdict Reversed: Sermon
Condemning Homosexuals Ruled Not Covered by Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,

2005, at A16.
7. See id. (explaining that while Sweden's hate-speech law was recently
extended to homosexuals, the appeals court found that it "was never intended to
stifle open discussion of homosexuality or restrict a pastor's right to preach").
8. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and
Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REv.
1255, 1267-81 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER (2004)) (endorsing A New World Order as correctly acknowledging "the
central debate in international law and politics [as focusing] not on the comparative

merits of realism versus idealism but rather on the governance dilemma and on
what constitutes a defensible position on the sovereignty-global governance
continuum").
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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by judges in a different system because of their expertise seems
justified only if the two systems have identical constitutions, not
merely in words, but in the values they protect. If the value systems
of the two constitutions differ, then a judge in one system, no matter
how expert she may be in her system's constitution, would seem to
have no expertise about the constitution of a different system.
This argument, however, may oversimplify Justice Kirby's point.
He may be arguing not so much that different constitutions rely on
identical principles, but that different constitutions ought to rely on
identical principles. One can imagine several somewhat different
rationales for this position.
One is a straight-forward reliance on natural law-that is, the idea
that judges have an obligation to apply legal rules derived from some
source other than human institutions. Justice Kirby rightly notes the
serious disputes about the meaningfulness of claims that natural law
exists or that it imposes obligations.' 0 Certainly, any view of law as
somehow independent of the human institutions that create it, as a
"transcendental body . . . outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it,"' 'or a "brooding omnipresence in the sky"' 2 has
been untenable in this country since Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
decided nearly seventy years ago.' 3 It is of course true, as Justice
Kirby observes, that there is a growing belief among the people of
the world in the importance of human rights in some general sense, 4
but it hardly follows from that fact that domestic judges are under
some obligation to conform their constitutions to some single model.
A second rationale for the argument that domestic constitutions
ought to embody identical values would derive from the argument
that the ultimate validation for any state's legal order is the

10. See Kirby, supra note 1, at 354 (explaining how critics view natural law as
"adiscredited theory, incompatible with national sovereignty").
11. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12.

S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

13. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. Kirby, supra note 1, at 354 ("Even if the character of human rights as
'natural' or 'innate' is disputable, the international law of human rights is already

having a large impact on the values and ideals of judges, lawyers, and other
citizens in many countries.").
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approbation of the world community. Here, the argument is not so
much based on natural law as on the argument that the values
constitutions ought to embody are those about which the states of the
world, or more precisely the legal elites of the world, have reached
15
consensus.
This is simply not the understanding of constitutions in the United
States. As Professor Rubenfeld has observed,
American or democratic national constitutionalism . . .
regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular
nation's democratically self-given legal and political
commitments. At any particular moment, these commitments
operate as checks and constraints on national democratic will.
But constitutional law is emphatically not antidemocratic.
Rather, it aims at democracy over time. Hence, it requires
that a nation's constitutional law be made and interpreted by
that nation's citizens, legislators, and judges. . . . For
Americans, constitutional law cannot, merely check
democracy. It must answer to democracy-have its source
and basis in a democratic constitutional politics and always,
somehow, be part of politics, even though it can invalidate
the outcomes
of the democratic process at any given
16
moment.
Thus, in American thinking, the proper test for an interpretation of a
constitution is not its conformity to some international consensus;
rather, "a democratic nation's constitutional law is supposed to
reflect that nation's fundamental legal and political commitments.
Consensus in the 'international community' is not the compelling
source of legal or constitutional authority that it's made out to be in
the [international] perspective. 1 7
Finally, the position that constitutional values ought to be identical
might be justified by reference to the increasing interconnectedness
of the world. Indeed, Justice Kirby states, "as technology and the

15. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at

22, 30. Professor Rubenfeld argues that the European view of constitutions is one
that guarantees a bundle of rights, rather than embodying populist choices. Id. at
26-28.
16. Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted).

17. Id. at 30.
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economy are internationalized, it is both inevitable and desirable that
the same development should happen in the law."' 8
That statement has some plausibility with respect to laws
governing intellectual property, banking, securities transactions, and
so on. Such areas of the law can be seen as performing primarily a
facilitative function, instructing natural and legal persons on the
proper means of achieving some objective they would like to
achieve. Obviously, standardizing such areas of the law can simplify
commerce. Further, to the extent that any given transaction comes
under the scrutiny of the legal systems of multiple states, closer
resemblance between different states' law minimizes the likelihood
that participants in the transaction will find themselves facing
inconsistent or even contradictory legal regimes.
But with respect to human rights differences, it is by no means
obvious that any convergence is inevitable. Certainly the pressures of
commercial interaction, which may drive legal convergence in the
business area, play a much less important role in the area of
individual rights. Questions involving such rights are, generally
speaking, local. Further, to the extent that differences in
understandings of rights reflect the different values of different
communities, asserting inevitable convergence in these areas implies
that such communities will tamely acquiesce in the replacement of
their values with those reflecting some cosmopolitan consensus. It is
difficult to see how such an outcome could come about unless the
community pays only lip-service to democracy, or unless the citizens
are too inert to insist that they be governed according to their own
notions of the proper role of government, rather than someone else's
notion.
In any event, it is not at all clear why such a development would
be desirable. Why is it a good thing if constitutional values are
homogenized? If Americans prefer more robust protections for free
expression than, for example, Swedes, why would it be a good thing
if either country were compelled to conform its law to that of the
other, or even for both to attempt to split the difference? The only
consequence of such an effort, it seems to me, would be that in at
least one, and perhaps both countries, the people would find

18.

Kirby, supra note 1, at 350.
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themselves deprived of guarantees they considered essential. Such a
development, to me, does not appear to be one deserving of applause.

II. JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
In his paper, Justice Kirby argues that adoption by judges of
international values will legitimize those values domestically. 19 In
other words, in cases in which ratified treaties have not been
implemented domestically, depriving judges of "any role in . .
regard to evolving treaty standards represents a negation of the
legitimate, but limited, lawmaking role of the courts ... and [of] the
assumption that the nation means what it says when it ratifies a
treaty."2 Furthermore, Justice Kirby argues that judges should not be
"imputed oracles for the majoritarian will,"21 but rather, in
incorporating international law domestically, judges should simply
engage in their normal function of "reconciling popular will and
enduring values."22 These arguments seem to share the assumption
that judges have, and ought to have, a very high degree of authority
in a democratic society. There is serious reason to question such
arguments, however.
First, it is by no means obvious that a judge's decision to rely
upon legal materials not previously considered relevant in her
domestic legal system will necessarily confer domestic legitimacy on
the practice. Indeed, the issue is more commonly presented as
whether the judge acts legitimately when she follows such a course.
Certainly, the American experience suggests that courts have great
difficulty bringing about an acceptance of views that were strongly
opposed by a large fraction of the community. Dred Scott v. Sanford
did not lead those opposed to slavery to acquiesce in its spread to the
territories, much less remove the slavery issue from public

19. Id.
20. Id. at 351.
21. Id. at 353 (recounting the sentiments of Harold Hongju Koh, The United
States Constitution and InternationalLaw: InternationalLaw as Partof Our Law,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 55 (2004)).
22. Id.
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discourse. 23 Furman v. Georgia did not lead the states of the union to
abandon capital punishment; on the contrary, that decision was
followed by federal and state legislative enactments imposing the
death penalty for crimes and at least one popular referendum
eliminating state constitutional objections to that penalty,24 factors
which played a role in the Court's decision to uphold certain death
penalty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia.25 Roe v. Wade has obviously
not ended the controversy in this country over abortion.26

As for a judicial role in the treaty process, the short answer is that
in the United States there is none. Further, to the extent the United
States has made clear that it does not mean what it says when it
ratifies a treaty-for example, by attaching reservations-the courts
bow to the determination of the political branches. Indeed, since the
Constitution assigns to the President and two-thirds of the Senate the
authority to decide what treaty obligations this country will accept,2 7
it is unclear what other judicial attitude could be consistent with the
Constitution.
Certainly it is true that constitutional courts cannot simply sway
with whatever popular winds may be blowing when the judges come
to decide a case. But to justify reliance on international law in

23. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (legitimizing the practice of
slavery in the United States as constitutional); see Barry Friedman, The History of
the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The Road to JudicialSupremacy, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 333, 415 (1998) (suggesting that the public firestorm erupting after
the Dred Scott decision was one of the precipitating factors of the civil war).
24. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of CapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 410 (1995) (asserting
that the Court misinterpreted the political atmosphere of the time and by 1975
thirty-five states and the federal government had redrafted their capital punishment
laws).
25. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion and judgment of the court).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); e.g., Angela Hooton, A Broader Vision
of the Reproductive Rights Movement: Fusing Mainstream and Latina Feminism,
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 59, 62 (2005) (observing that the Roe
decision has brought the debate over reproductive rights to a highly-visible
national level and as a result, the pro-choice movement has had to spend much of
its resources on efforts to thwart the pro-life movement from eroding those rights).
27. U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2.
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interpreting a constitution as simply a matter of reining in attempts
by political majorities to act in a way contrary to "enduring values"
assumes that the values to be guarded are those expressed in
international instruments, not those deemed legitimate locally. But in
the United States, as Professor Rubenfeld observes, "[t]he ideal is not
to make constitutional courts responsive to popular will at any given
moment, but to make sure that constitutional law remains answerable
to the nation's project of political self-determination over time."2 8
In addition to inclining toward enhanced judicial authority, Justice
Kirby further asserts the desirability of judicial participation "in an
interactive dialogue . . . between the constitutional courts of many
countries" 29 and stresses the risk that a court failing to participate in
such an international judicial dialog will suffer "a diminished
influence ... in the world of ideas."30 Yet the calls for international
judicial dialog and warnings of waning international influence
suggest that domestic judges should respond, first of all, to the views
of judges of foreign and international courts in human rights matters,
rather than to the domestic legal community. This is hardly obvious.
Certainly professional reaction to a court's performance can be a
useful corrective for judges whose interpretations of the law are
wrong-headed. Further, one can imagine circumstances in which the
main source of such reaction would come from other countries'
courts-for example, if a domestic legal system was relatively new
and its legal community small and inexperienced. But when there is a
vital, active bar and legal academic community in a given country,
that country's judges certainly do not deprive themselves of
professional feedback if they focus primarily on the domestic
reaction to their decisions.
It might also make sense for domestic judges to be concerned with
international judicial opinion if domestic judges saw themselves as
owing their primary loyalty to some sort of international judicial
fraternity, rather than to the citizens who have entrusted them with
the responsibility of interpreting a nationalconstitution. However, it
is not clear why the good opinion of other judges should be more

28. Rubenfeld, supra note 15, at 28 (emphasis added).

29. Kirby, supra note 1, at 350.
30. Id. at 360.
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important to members of a domestic court than the views of their
fellow citizens, from whom the judges derive their authority.

III. JUDGES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Justice Kirby rejects arguments against the use of international law
that are grounded either on its ambiguity or on the difficulties
domestic judges have in using it. 31 I believe, however, that these
problems are greater than Justice Kirby does.
Regarding ambiguity, Justice Kirby puts forward institutional
examples such as the European Court of Human Rights and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights as sources whose decisions can
dispel ambiguity. 32 Certainly that is true regarding the treaties that
those courts interpret. To the extent, however, that the issue is not
treaty law, but customary international law, the views of those courts
are necessarily less helpful. Indeed, Justice Kirby's mention of them
illustrates the problem. Customary international law derives from the
practice of states. While judicial opinions may provide helpful
collections and interpretations of state practice, it is the practice
which is the ultimate test. To focus exclusively on judicial opinions
amounts to a conclusion that courts, rather than states, make
customary international law, which is doubtful. But if the content of
customary international law actually turns on state practice instead of
judicial determinations, then questions of ambiguity and obscurity of
sources become quite serious.
Of course, as Justice Kirby observes, many scholars have
addressed human rights questions,33 but that fact does not eliminate
the problem. On the contrary, as Professor Kelly has observed:
International law treatises, the writings of international
scholars, and the decisions of the I.C.J. portray an
international legal system blessed with a wide array of
customary norms to structure behavior and resolve disputes.
While these norms are termed "customary," they rarely are
based on significant state practice and are devoid of concrete

31. Id. at 351, 354-55.
32. Id. at 351.

33. Id. at 354-55 (reasoning that judges can learn how to access the work of
these scholars to take advantage of established international law).
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evidence of states' acceptance of these norms as law. The
primary substantive norms in the Restatement, for example,
are judge-made or scholar-declared norms, not customary
norms. Advocates and scholars selectively use state practice
and cite each other for the proposition that a norm has been
generally accepted as law. Some are quite candid about this
process of norm declaration. The inductive methodology is
rarely used.34
The illegitimacy of reliance on such sources has been noted by at
least one American Court:
This notion-that professors of international law enjoy a
special competence to prescribe the nature of customary
international law wholly unmoored from legitimating
territorial or national responsibilities, the interests and
practices of States, or (in countries such as ours) the
processes of democratic consent-may not be unique, but it is
certainly without merit.
Put simply, and despite protestations to the contrary by some
scholars (or "publicists" or "jurists"), a statement by the most
highly qualified scholars that international law is x cannot
trump evidence that the treaty practice or customary practices
of States is otherwise, much less trump a statute or
constitutional provision of the United States at variance with
x. This is only to emphasize the point that scholars do not
make law, and that it would be profoundly inconsistent with
the law-making processes within and between States for
courts to permit scholars to do so by relying upon their
statements, standing alone, as sources of international law. In
a system governed by the rule of law, no private person-or
group of men and women such as comprise the body of
international law scholars--creates the law. Accordingly,
instead of relying primarily on the works of scholars for a
statement of customary international law, we look primarily
to the formal lawmaking and official actions of States and
only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of the
established practice of States.35

34. J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J.
449,478 (2000).
35. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2003) (footnotes
omitted).
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In light of the temptation to rely on convenient but doubtful
sources of international law that domestic judges inevitably will face,
too much confidence in their ability to deal with this subject would
seem unjustified.

CONCLUSION
Justice Kirby's paper brings to the fore issues which demand
discussion in the American legal community. However, as I have
tried to show, his position raises a number of difficulties. It assumes
an identity of constitutional values which clearly does not exist, at
least regarding a number of important issues. It assigns to judges a
role which, at least in the American understanding, is not clearly one
they should bear. And it understates the difficulties domestic judges
would have in working with international materials. For all these
reasons, I must respectfully disagree with Justice Kirby's
conclusions.

